Aufsatz

Kracauer’s Quality:
The “Humanistic” Approach of Content Analysis

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Abstract
My paper focuses on Siegfried Kracauer’s essay about qualitative content analysis published in the middle of the 20th century. I briefly demonstrate the complexity of the author’s oeuvre, which had been forgotten for a while, but later rediscovered by his posterity. More precisely, my main question is the following: how did Kracauer preserve his “humanistic” way of thinking—and, as a characteristic part of it, his sense for the tensions of meaning—in the founding era of communication and media researches (so, in the time of the genesis of content analysis), which was dominated by social sciences? Present study is dealing solely with the conceptual level of content analysis, so it lacks the exemplifying potentials of an examination of an actual corpus. I do not aim to apply the methodological insights practically and immediately in this text. I will endeavour to execute such an applicative phase in another paper.

Keywords: history of communication and media research, humanistic approach, methodological reflection, qualitative content analysis, Siegfried Kracauer

Qualitative Content Analysis
The precursors of content analysis are considered to be, among others, the classical and biblical exegesis or the techniques of Freudian dream interpretation (cf. Mayring 2000). These kind of cultural historical retrospections are intended to enhance the prestige of content analysis, although they may look back to far. It is more precise to state that the method’s origin can be traced back to the researches of totalitarian and war propaganda in the middle of the 20th century.
The American sociologist, Morris Janowitz, says that it was Harold D. Lasswell, political scientist and communication theorist, who laid the foundations of content analysis (or at least the quantitative version of it) in his *World Politics and Personal Insecurities* (published in 1935). Then Lasswell elaborated the method in the “Wartime Communications” research project sponsored by the Library of Congress during the World War II, which was documented in his *Languages of Politics* (cf. Janowitz 1968–69: 646–647). Certainly, there had been several processes for content analysis previously in many subfields of social science (history, law, political science, anthropology). Yet, Lasswell may be considered the originator of content analysis, because his aim was to create a rigorously systematized and standardized scientific framework (which can be precisely reproduced) for the study of documents (cf. Janowitz 1968–69: 647), instead of the methodological and disciplinary diversity. There are views which simplify the Lasswellian legacy to the analysis of “manifest content” (that is, the study of text elements which can be validly and unambiguously coded). However, Lasswell himself gave a broader definition of content analysis and reckoned with the fact that the research has to extend to “latent content” (that is, the study of notions which are only implicated in documents) as well. The differentiation between the overt and covert layers of meaning is a serious dilemma for content analysis on its own. The other burden of the Lasswellian approach is the paradox that while it considers the mass media contents to be reflections of a given social order and value system, it simultaneously considers these contents to be active elements of social and mental changes. Thus, originally, content analysis was planned to serve the study of the interactions, strategies and goals of the active agents of mass communication on the one hand, while it was also intended to be applied in the interpretation of the audience’s response and reaction on the other (cf. Janowitz 1968–69: 647–648). Since Lasswell had been inspired by the mindset of economics during his studies at the University of Chicago, the chief intellectual challenge for him was to create the political science’s own methodology for the quantitative description of its research data and materials (cf. Janowitz 1968–69: 649).

Quantitative analysis and its numeric approach, because of their potential to become simplistic and distorting, had already been criticized in the middle of the 20th century. Then—during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s—a separate subfield of qualitative content analysis gradually evolved and became legitimized (cf. Mayring 2000). However, a hybrid approach also emerged in the 2000s. One of the main representatives of this standpoint was Phillip Mayring, a German psychologist, and Klaus Krippendorff, a German-American communication scholar and social science methodologist, who has since become one of the chief reference points in the literature of content analysis. According to Mayring, qualitative content analysis should be
considered such a hybrid method which equally contains quantitative and qualitative aspects, hence it is necessary to elaborate a common criteria system for quantitative and qualitative versions of content analysis (cf. Mayring 2000, Mayring 2014). In his understanding the two methods are bound by the following characteristics (which, in addition, guarantee the disciplinary legitimation of content analysis): the research has to frame itself in a given communication theory model, the study has to dissect its material into elements according to the rules of a previously defined process, the interpretation has to be based on carefully planned and revised categories, the results have to be open for validation by other research projects and researchers (cf. Mayring 2000). Furthermore, Krippendorff considers the differentiation itself—between the two versions of content analysis—to be redundant, because he assumes that every textual analysis should be qualitative in the long run. According to him, the only reason for the genesis of the self-descriptive category of qualitative content analysis was that the users of this label wanted to separate themselves from the techniques of the rudimental “newspaper analysis” emerged at the beginning of the 20th century (cf. Krippendorff 2004: 15–16).

However, when qualitative content analysis is discussed on its own, the following virtue of said method is acknowledged: it has the potential to explore—besides the numerical survey of the frequencies of the given documents’ “physical characteristics”—not just the contextual aspects of media texts but the deep layers of their meaning as well. At the same time, qualitative analysis is frequently criticized because of the following characteristics: it has a tendency to allow the analyst to become subjective or impressionistic, its process can hardly be codified, thus there is a slight chance for standardized application of the method, the results of qualitative research are not precise and cannot be generalized, and the method cannot be utilized in policy or practical decision-making (cf. Devi Prasad 2019). According to Udo Kuckartz, a German education researcher, qualitative content analysis (or even a short list of its theoretical authors) was often mentioned only in a way of simple labelling or name-dropping. Those who act like this pretend as if qualitative analysis was already a codified or unified method, and they forget about the fact that qualitative content analysis exists in varieties (cf. Kuckartz 2019). Nonetheless, it may be consensual that the name of the method can be traced back to Siegfried Kracauer.

**Kracauer and the Challenges of Qualitative Content Analysis**

Kracauer was a German Jew journalist, philosopher, and sociologist, who immigrated firstly to Paris in 1933, then to the USA in 1941, and who had previously built a reputation as a film and mass culture researcher (cf. von
Moltke 2022: 4). He was loosely related to the Frankfurt School (cf. Kuckartz 2019); but in the end he took a different path than the chief representatives of the group: after the war Kracauer did not return to Germany, and neither was his academic reception or institutionalization similar to that of Adorno or Horkheimer (cf. Sullivan 2023). Sometimes he was acknowledged as a cultural critic, and other times—or rather mostly—as a film theoretician. But, all in all, Siegfried Kracauer was such a unique scholar, particularly in the USA in his time, who—as the film researcher and social psychologist Daniel Sullivan assumes—has innovatively combined social scientific study with philosophical aspects and aesthetic interpretation. The legacy of Kracauer was determined for a long time by the well-known topos of the European intellectual immigrated to America, and, additionally, also by the assumption that he, in spite of his assimilative efforts, felt marginalized and alienated in the American phase of his career (cf. Petro 1991: 134). For instance, in the early summary of Kracauer’s professional life path, Martin Jay, the American intellectual historian, highlighted the outsider position as a constant characteristic of his oeuvre (cf. Jay 1975–76).

According to Johannes von Moltke, a German film scholar and cultural historian, Kracauer was known “only” as a film scholar at the time of his death (in the middle of the 1960s). The attention towards his intellectual legacy—after some sporadic initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s—started to increase significantly only in the 2000s and 2010s: Suhrkamp Verlag nearly completed the critical edition of Kracauer’s works, the first serious biography of him was published, and von Moltke himself wrote a book on Kracauer’s American years as well (cf. von Moltke 2022: 4–5). Posteriority has rediscovered in Kracauer’s oeuvre the philosopher of history, the sociologist, the novelist, the feuilletonist; and more specifically his relation to Kant, Panofsky or the Poetik und Hermeneutik group (cf. von Moltke 2016: epilogue, paragraphs 1–2). All in all, Kracauer nowadays can be considered a transatlantic figure, who built bridges between the intellectual traditions of two continents, but in a way that finally made him a marginal actor both in the circles of the Frankfurt School and in the group of New York Intellectuals (cf. von Moltke 2022: 6).

The European immigrant Kracauer was not really acknowledged as a social scientist and the founder of qualitative research in the contemporary USA (cf. Sullivan 2023). While in the 1940s he conducted film and propaganda research in the Museum of Modern Art sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation (cf. von Moltke 2022: 6–7), in the 1950s he could join only as a part-time academic contributor into the work of the Bureau of Applied Social Research (led by Paul Lazarsfeld) at Columbia University (cf. Sullivan 2023). So, on the one hand, the reason for the low level of Kracauer’s reputation in the field of social and communication research was, in Sullivan’s (2023) understanding, that Kracauer participated in
“administrative” instead of a critical research in the last phase of his career. On the other hand, according to Kuckartz (2019), the marginal position was a consequence of the fact that Kracauer had arrived into the US from a different scientific/academic culture, and he was inspired not primarily by the empirical way of thinking, but rather by the mindsets of social philosophy or humanities.

Kracauer’s paper on qualitative research (The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis) was published in 1952–53 in a special issue of The Public Opinion Quarterly, which focused on international communication research. Its guest editor was Leo Löwenthal and the featured papers were authored by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Harold D. Lasswell. Kracauer’s text criticized the concept of content analysis, which was accepted in his days and was defined by the works of Lasswell and Bernard Berelson. Instead of the quantitative principles inherited by Lasswell and Berelson’s focus on “manifest content”, Kracauer suggested a broader perspective and a more complex mindset. His endeavor can be traced back to his work in the 1940s, when he started his research in the film library of MoMA. His first task was to develop analytical methods for comparing the German film output with other German media products back then, and thus he was related to other research projects sponsored by Rockefeller Foundation. The peculiarity of Kracauer’s position was that while other projects established communication research as a social scientific subfield with quantitative and empirical perspective in those years, he pursued the possibility of an interpretation with humanities background specifically. Although, as it is noted by von Moltke, the 1940s was such an early phase regarding the development of communication and media researches that the distinction between social sciences and humanities was not yet sharply drawn, and the different research projects shared the common desire of understanding totalitarian mass communication (cf. von Moltke 2016: chapter 2, paragraphs 7–8; von Moltke 2022: 8–9).

One of the main thesis of the paper entitled The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis, which is usually considered to be the manifesto of qualitative content analysis (cf. Devi Prasas 2019), is that the potentials of communication research can be deployed only if the emphasis is shifted from quantitative research to qualitative study (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 631). The essay questions the aim of quantitative approach to define the “direction” of a communication in general, that is, how affirmative/negative/neutral a document or a media text is on a given topic. Thus, in quantitative research, coding may often become a simple scaling; the coders—driven by the desire for validation and control—are given thoroughly elaborated directives, so that they can apply the scale in a standardized way for different elements of a document or media text (or for different materials) (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 631–632). However, the mechanical and standardized examination, no
matter how refined measurement method it may provide, cannot enable us
to reconstruct the original “direction” of the given communicative act. This
rigid approach impedes our ability to examine the interrelations of the
minute components of (media) texts in detail; though such connections are
the factors which truly shape the meaning of given texts. As, in Kracauer’s
own words (1952–53: 632), any literary critic would tell: “communications
often move in a ‘direction’ at variance with what a computing of the
directions of their elements would yield”. And even if quantitative approach
involves the examination of interrelation between the components of a
(media) text, it will not leave the area of numbers and statistics, thus it cannot
worthily contribute to the interpretation of the formation of meaning (cf.

Probably, Kracauer’s most important objection to the method of quantita-
tive research is that it restricts its scope on the “manifest” content mechani-
cally. He supported (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 634) this insight with a quota-
tion from Bernard Berelson’s methodological guide (Content Analysis in
Communications Research, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1952). Berelson
suggested a scale that differentiates communicative acts on the basis of the
degree to which the members of the audience reach the same reading of a
text/document. He placed on one end of the scale simple new stories, and
obscure modern poems on the other; and he definitely considered content
analysis applicable only to those cases (on the news stories end of the scale)
which provide simple and direct understanding. That is, the communicative
acts or materials which, for very different coders, can be coded
unambiguously by quantitative indicators and which do not possess—or
rather seems to lack—the latent layers of meaning. However, according to
Kracauer this approach puts communication research into an awkward
situation. Because content analysis, even if it does not primarily examine
obscure poetic texts, has to be involved mostly with materials which, due to
their complexity, exceed the level of simplicity illustrated with the brevity of
short news By Berelson. These are the (media) texts in which deep layers of
meaning not only penetrate the level of “manifest” content, but these deep
layers are connected specifically to those aims/functions of the (media) texts
at which the content analysis may be directed (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 634).

Kracauer considered qualitative examination to be more suitable for the
analysis of documents or media texts than any other method. While he
acknowledged that there could be common aspects and overlaps in quantitave
and qualitative approaches, he highlighted that the definitive difference of
the two methods lies in the fact that qualitative analysis lacks the interest in
frequency during the dissection of given materials into components.
According to Kracauer, what solely “counts” in qualitative examination is
the question what “selection and rational organization” of elements/
categories may be able to condense the substantive meanings of the given
text (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 637–638). That is, even if qualitative content analysis occasionally utilizes quantifiable categories, it is, on every account, considered to be more valuable because of its ability to explore such textual dimensions which cannot be quantifiable, and thus they cannot be accessed by a quantitative examination. As Kracauer’s summative reading suggests, aims, effects or directions of meaning of a media text cannot be revealed graphically by the numerical categorization of the text’s components, but by the interpretation of the interconnections of these components. Since the definitive factor in the formation of meaning of a communicative act or document is often not a frequently recurring language unit, but rather a „configuration of statements” which appear only once (or rarely) in the given material (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 639–640).

Nonetheless, qualitative analysis is compelled to face the dilemma that the lifelike experience of the exploration of the textuality of media texts has its serious price: this method inevitably seems to be subjective and impressionistic from the perspective of exact sciences (chiefly on the area of precision and validity). But, as Kracauer assumes, this problem (or doubt) of objectivity must not straightforwardly result in the irregularity and deregulation of qualitative examination, because it is not simply a field for arbitrary speculations (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 641). In any way, it is a relevant question for Kracauer whether communication research has to pursue the aspects and criteria of exact sciences. According to him, the documents or media texts studied by content analysis are not barely collections of facts, but they are organic parts of the “process of living”, and thus every element of theirs simultaneously “vibrates” with the intentions of their production and also with the possible effects of their reception. The thesis of the closing of Kracauer’s paper is that the communicative acts are not fixed entities but challenges which make us face the ambivalences of the formation of meaning, thus they urge the analyst to react with her/his whole personality, and also compel her/him to “absorb” the ambivalences of meaning. That is why the involvement/subjectivity cannot be excluded on the side of the researcher in the process of content analysis, and that is why quantifiable analysis that aims for objectivity can often be inappropriate for the exploration of the inherent dynamics of contents (cf. Kracauer 1952–53: 641–642). Nevertheless, the very last sentence of Kracauer’s paper postpones the codification of the main techniques of qualitative content analysis into the future.

Kracauer’s concepthas rightly been criticized chiefly from the perspective of practical usage. For instance, while Mayring acknowledges him as the innovator of the classical version of content analysis, also cites him as an author who remains in the field of theoric programme, and thus cannot provide or codify actual analytical techniques (cf. Mayring 2014: 21).
According to Kuckartz’s (2019) more patient reading, there is a holistic way of thinking in the background of Kracauer’s approach.

On the other hand, Kuckartz diverges from Kracauer’s concept. Kuckartz assumes that the aim of qualitative content analysis—due to the fact that it is realized mostly in team work—is to provide understandings which can be made intersubjective among different coders, and not to develop probable or unlikely (individual) readings. But while Kuckartz’s definition highlights the inevitable uniformity of a research conducted by several analysts in the framework of a research team, Kracauer writes about the subjectivity the “disciplined subjectivity”—of qualitative content analysis in the conclusion of his paper. As I have already referred to it above, Kracauer considers most of the communicative acts not to be fixed entities, but “ambivalent challenges” that can be studied by a researcher who is involving her/his entire personality. (“Only in approaching these wholes with his own whole being will the analyst be able both to discover and determine their meaning—or one of their meanings—and thus help them to fulfill themselves”—Kracauer 1952–53: 642). Kuckartz’s definition and Kracauer’s original approach differ not only in the fact, that the former highlights the uniformity of team research and the latter emphasizes the importance of the individuality of reading. There is also a contradiction between them regarding—the static or dynamic nature of the analytical process. Kuckartz aims for the stability of codification, since the principles of unified text processing, which he propagates, result in collectively fixed readings. In contrast, Kracauer is interested in the dynamics of working in the organization of text components into a meaning. The relationship between the parts and the whole of a text is more emphatic in the wording used in a manuscript of Kracauer, entitled A Statement on the Humanistic Approach (written in 1951), which can be considered a draft of his paper in The Public Opinion Quarterly in 1952–53. In The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis, we can read the following: “What counts alone in qualitative analysis—if the verb is permissible in a context which defies counting—is the selection and rational organization of such categories as condense the substantive meanings of the given text” (Kracauer 1952–53: 637–638). However, in the manuscript from 1951, the phrases of “such small units” and “the whole” occur instead of “such categories” and “the given text”: “What counts alone in qualitative analysis is the selection and rational organization of such small elements as are expressive of the essentials of the whole” (Kracauer 2012: 126).

The draft version is an important source for the deeper understanding of Kracauer’s thinking, and not only because of the microphilological data demonstrated above. The manuscript, which equates qualitative research with humanistic reading („what may be called systematic qualitative analysis or the humanistic approach” – Kracauer 2012: 124), provides a more elabo-
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rated concept of disciplined subjectivity than the finally published version from 1952–53.

**Kracauer and the Humanistic Approach**

In *A Statement on the Humanistic Approach* Kracauer accuses quantitative researchers of considering the intuitive characteristic of qualitative method on the basis of their desire for scientific exactness to be simply impressionism, which cannot be legitimized in research (cf. Kracauer 2012: 124). In contrast, according to Kracauer’s argument, intuition is far less a limiting factor for the humanistic approach. It became doubted for the middle of the 20th century, because since the end of the 19th century people of the western world had gradually lost their ability to let “themselves be imbued with the ideas that once had a hold on their minds” (Kracauer 2012: 124–125). As a consequence, intuition is short of groundings (“lacks sanctioned sources”) when providing discursive legitimation, and, in this degraded position, it is equated with the expression of sheer opinion (cf. Kracauer 2012: 125).

In humanistic reading, according to Kracauer, the humility of consistent thinking, which was able to adjust to the frameworks of great ideologies, was the guarantee of avoiding the faults of capriciousness and partiality. Since ideological thinking (in an affirmative sense) was not really viable in the middle of the 20th century, Kracauer suggests such assets for compensating subjectivity as “a sense of history, a flair for ideological currents, and experience of human behavior” (Kracauer 2012: 126–127).

Kracauer’s praise for the great ideologies, which may shape thinking in a positive direction because of their role in controlling/framing intuition, becomes really interesting if we confront it with some insights of Theodore W. Adorno’s essay on Kracauer. The text was originally written as a radio talk in 1964 for Kracauer’s 75th birthday (I have consulted with the English version of it). According to a footnote comment of the English translation, the two notable scholars had such a lively correspondence on the text that Adorno had to modify it at several places when it was finally published in print (cf. Adorno 1991: 159). The essay helps us to understand Kracauer’s thinking (more closely: his relationship with ideologies) because it declares immediately at the beginning that Kracauer, who was engaged in philosophy during his whole life, was “fond of calling himself an alogical man” (Adorno 1991: 161). Adorno states that an “antisystematic tendency” penetrated Kracauer’s whole oeuvre. Since he did not receive academic qualification in the field of philosophy, in a way, he could be considered an amateur thinker, at least because of the fact that he was not interested in the great constructions of philosophy. On the other hand, according to Adorno, a main characteristic of Kracauer’s style of thought and writing was his ability to
connect different elements to each other “with a gentle carefulness”, even when the tempo of the movement of his thought became very quick (cf. Adorno 1991: 161–162).

The duality of aversion to intellectual systematization and the carefully grounded train of thought seems to be detectable also in Kracauer’s analytical relationship with films. According to Adorno, his friend decoded film as ideology, but as an inherently consistent ideology which is able to shape actively the needs of the audience, and, at the same time, also adapts to them (cf. Adorno 1991: 167). A similar duality was revealed in Kracauer’s thinking by Leo Löwenthal, another old friend and Frankfurt colleague (in addition, the guest editor of the issue of *The Public Opinion Quarterly* in which *The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis* was published). Löwenthal’s essay was originally presented as a keynote address at a Kracauer symposium in 1990. According to his personal recollection, Kracauer, both during the German and American phases of his career, constantly wanted to be a “thorn” or “debunker”. Good examples for this, in Löwenthal’s understanding, were Kracauer’s analysis of Nazi propaganda films in the 1940s, or his critique of empirical research methodology in the 1950s. Concisely: Kracauer always tried to behave as a critic. However, in this position, as Löwenthal revealed, Kracauer was driven by a dual logic. On the one hand, by a resistance to “surrender to any absolutes”, and on the other hand, by the discipline of the analyst’s “extreme commitment” to his subjects (cf. Löwenthal 1991: 10).

Conclusions

In this paper I have reviewed Siegfried Kracauer’s thoughts on the problems of quantitative content analysis and on the possibilities of qualitative method. My question was the following: what kind of novelty and speciality, even in our times, may Kracauer’s approach provide in contrast to the concept of content analysis which was accepted in his time, and which pursued scientific exactness and regulation? I wanted to reveal the analytical aspects on which “humanistic” reading—as Kracauer called it—can be based beyond the area of researches intended to study media texts in mass and in a standardized way. My presumption was that researchers who pursue methods of analysis other than the examinations applying rigorous systems of categories and demanding the homogenization of readings, can be inspired by such an author, who—according to Adorno—was interested in “intellectual experience as something individual, determined to think only what he could fill with substance” (Adorno 1991: 162).

On the basis of Kracauer’s paper on qualitative content analysis published in 1952–53 (*The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis*) and his manu-
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script from 1951 (A Statement on the Humanistic Approach), which can be considered an earlier draft of the previously mentioned text, and also by taking into account the intellectual profiles of Kracauer given by his close colleagues/friends (Adorno and Löwenthal), as a summary, I suggest that the “humanistic” approach of the content analysis of media texts and documents are defined by the following aspects or characteristics: (A) Kracauer did not provide a concretely detailed and systematically standardized methodology. Instead, he focused on the ways in which the separate components of a media text transform into an organic whole (“the selection and rational organization of such categories as condense the substantive meanings of the given text”). (B) Simultaneously, he warned that most of the communicative acts or documents, which seems to organize its components into a—previously mentioned—rationalized unity, cannot be considered permanently fixed constructions of meaning, rather “ambivalent challenges”, which demand the involvement of the whole personality of the interpreter. (C) However, the “humanistic” approach in the Kracauerian sense (that is, qualitative content analysis) should avoid the possibilities of becoming extremely partial or capricious. To realize this, a disciplined subjectivity is required, and it can be based on a mindset driven by the humility of consistent train of thoughts (which, in the past, gained the discipline by adapting to great ideologies). (D) It is somehow a piquant situation that Kracauer highlighted the ability of adaptation to fixed intellectual frameworks as the disciplining/controlling factor of the individuality of reading; since—according to his scholar friends—he was an “antisystematic” thinker resisting to absolutes. At the same time, his intellectual habitus also involved an “extreme commitment” to his subjects, which was able to connect different elements to each other “with a gentle carefulness”.

Siegfried Kracauer’s ideas on content analysis may certainly be criticized and considered as insufficient. Not merely because these ideas were conceived more than half of a century ago, but also because they remained fragmented and experimental. However, the paper on qualitative analysis and the manuscript about humanistic approach can be read as dense summaries of Kracauer’s “American years” (that is, the closing phase of his oeuvre) which reveal the peculiar case of a “humanist” entering into the field of social science. As Johannes von Moltke assumes, Kracauer, due to his film analytical works in the 1940-50s and his research on the political attitude of the immigrants that arrived from behind the Iron Curtain (that is, his book Satellite Mentality co-authored with Paul L. Berkman), joined to the projects which founded communication and media research as part of social sciences (cf. von Moltke 2016: Epilogue, paragraph 29). Meanwhile, Kracauer “remained a humanist first and a social scientist a distant second” (von Moltke 2016: Epilogue, paragraph 30). The summary of this intellectual habitus is, according to von Moltke (2016: Epilogue, paragraph 31), the
paper on *The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis*. It was published in a social science journal dedicated to the research of public opinion, yet, it drew attention to the tensions of meaning formation “vibrating” in every elements of documents/contents, and it centered the method of content analysis around the—as von Moltke (2016) puts is, hermeneutical—question of the interaction between the interpreter and her/his research material.

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